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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is basically a contract action wherein plain-
tiffs are seekinq to recover all no-fault benefits to which 
they are entitled under law and to establish that defendant 
Mid-Century has no, or only limited, subroqation riqhts to a 
iudgment against a third-party tortfeasor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellants herein, Carrielee and ~teven Wilde 
(hereinafter "Wilde"), were the insureds under a :oolicy 
issued by respondent-defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company 
(hereinafter "Mid-Century"). In March, 1978, Mrs. Wilrle was 
injured in an accident caused by one Verna Caffey. An ac-
tion was filed in the Third District Court and came to trial 
in June, 1979, under the case headina of Wilde v. Caffey, 
Third District Court No. C-78-4523 {hereinafter referred to 
as "the Caffey case"). Third Party Defendant Nationwide 
Insurance Company {hereinafter "Nationwide") was Caffey' s 
insurer. It is Wilde's contention that the judgment in that 
case was totally inadequate to compensate Wilde for her 
injuries. 
This immediate action was filed aqainst Mid-
Century because it failed to pay Wilde the full no fault 
benefits to which Wilde is entitled under U.C.A. 1953 
§31-41-1 et seq. The Third District Court granted Summary 
Judgment against Wilde on the basis of Jones v. Transamerica 
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.J:.ns .. Co .• , 592 P.2d. 6.0,9 (Utah 1979}. 
Nationwide, at the conclusion of the Wilde v. Caf-
fey case, recognized subrogation rights asserted by Mid-Cen-
tury and deducted all of the no-fault benefits paid to Wilde 
from the amount of the iudgment. This action was filed to 
recover from Mid-Century the full value of the no-fault 
benefits to which Wilde is entitled. After the action was 
filed and after the hearinq on Summary Judqment, which was 
entered against Wilde on January 16, 1980, this court handed 
down the decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, S. Ct. 
No. 15983 (February 7, 1980). This presents an additional 
argument for granting Wilde's full amount of no fault bene-
fits without subrogation·. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Wilde seeks reversal of the Summary 
Judgment entered aqainst it by the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County on January 16, 1980, the Honorable 
Bryant Croft, District Judge, presiding. The case should be 
remanded with instruction that Wilde may recover, if proved, 
all no-fault benefits up to the rnaximum alloweo by law, as 
well as part or all of amounts subroqatea to ~id-Century. 
- 2 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts herein are not in dispute. 
Appellant Carrielee Wilde, an insured under the policy of 
her husband, Steven Wilde, was injured in an automobile 
accident on March 24, 1978. She subsequently filed an 
action aqainst one Verna Caffey (the Caffey case). Prior to 
the trial, Wilde was paid no-fault insurance benefits by 
Mid-Century in the amount of $3,587.98, which was appor-
tioned as follows: 
a. Medical Expenses 
b. Loss of wages 
c. Loss of services 
TOTAL 
$ 889.48 
$1,402.50 
$1,296.00 
$3,587.98 
Pursuant to special verdict in the Wilde v. Caffey 
case, the jury awarded at the trial of that matter on June 
4, 1979 the following: 
a. Medical Expenses (past and future) 
b. Lost wages (through trial nate) 
c. Lost future income benefits 
d. General ~amages (pain and suffering) 
s 989 
$2,000 
-o-
$1, 000 
TOTAL $3,989 
Wilde maintains that this was totally inadequate comoensa-
tion for her injuries and that she has not been made whole. 
rAid-Century claimed subrogation for the no-fault 
benefits paid. Nationwide thereafter tendered Wilde a check 
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for only .$401. 02 p.lus interest, which tend_er Wilde xeeused, 
thus preserving Mid-Century's subrogation rights aqainst 
Nationwide. 
After the t~ial, Wilde brouqht the present action 
against Mid-Century for payment of additional no-fault bene-
fits as r~quired under U.C.A. 1953 §31-41-1 et seg. Appel-
lant claims that she is entitled under the act to a maximum 
.of $4,862 for lost wages, without proof of fault. Sl,402.50 
was paid by Mid-Century, which it later subrogatea to the 
i udqment Wilde obtained against Caffey, which subrogation 
may be unlawful under Allstate "-7. Ivie, supra. (See Point 
II). Thus, with respect to the wages, Wilde is entitled to 
a minimum of $3 ,459. 50, .and possibly the subrogated 
$1,402.50, if she can establish at trial her inability to 
work for a year, for a total of $4,862. Wilde submitted to 
the court below a letter from her doctor indicating that it 
would not have been possible for her to return to work prior 
to March 27, 1979. R. 27, 40. Thus, there is a question of 
fact with respect to the amount of wages owed to Wilde. 
With respect to household services, the maximum 
allowable under law is $4 ,380. Of this sum, Mid-Century 
paid $1,296 directly to Wilde. As with the compensation for 
lost waqes, Mid-Century subroqated this sum against the 
judqment awarded to Wilde in the Caffey case. Under 
Allstate v. Ivie, Wilde is entitled to the $1,2.9.6 (-see Point 
- 4 -
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II) plus an additional $3, 084 (for the total of $4, 380) if 
she can estahlish factually that she was unable. to perform 
household services for a year. 
factual question yet to be resolved. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
This presents another 
WILDE MAY RECOVER THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT 
OF ALLOWABLE NO-FAULT BENEFITS FROM HER 
INSURER, MID-CENTURY, EVEN THOUGH SHE 
WAS SUCCESSFUL IN RECOVERING A JUDGMENT 
FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AGAINST AN 
INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY (CAFFEY). 
Statutory Provisions 
The Utah No-Fault Act provides that one of its 
purposes is: 
••. to require the payment of certain 
prescribed benefits .•. throuqh ... insur-
ance on the basis of no-fault, 
preserving, however, the riqht of an 
insured person to pursue the customary 
tort claims ••• (where more serious 
injuries occur). (emphasis added) 
U.C.A. 1953 §31-41-2. 
Section 9 ( 1) specifically provides that a person 
can recover no-fault benefits and still file an action for 
"general damages arising out of personal injl"ries (resulting 
in) •.. (c) permanent disability". Thus it is clear that the 
act intends to "reouire" the payment of certain prescribed 
no-fault benefits. Thoc::e benefits are inter al ia the pay-
ment for lost wages up to a year and · $12. 00 a day (for a 
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maximum of a year) for househo1d services, "reqard1ess of 
whether any of these expenses are actually incurred". 
§31-41-6(b)(ii). There is not the slightest bit of evidence 
in the statutory language of the no-fault act to indicate 
that the legislature intended to cut off an injured person's 
rights to no-fault benefits simply because she sues the 
tortfeasor, pursuant to §9 and happens to be only partially 
successful in recovering a hoped-for, greater amount. 
Jones Distinquished 
Mid-Century cites the recent case of Jones v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), as 
dispositive against appellant's claims in this case. (R. 
7 3) However, the facts of that case are\ vastly different 
than the facts of the case at the bar. In Jones, a plain-
tiff was injured in an accident and was paid some no-fault 
benefits. Id. at 610. Subsequently, he went back to work 
and claimed that due to the injury, he was di.sabled and had 
a 25% loss of income. Id. The plaintiff also filed an 
action against the tortfeasor anri thereafter arrived at a 
voluntary settlement for the sum of $6,000. The settlement 
agreement executed by the plaintiff recited that it was~ 
settlement of any and all claims and that it constituted a 
full release of the defendant/tortfeasor from any and all 
further liability. Id. at 612. Ther~after, when the ~lain­
tiff in that case sou9ht additional no-fault benefits from 
- 6 -
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Transamerica Insurance Co., the lower court riahtly r.Jenierl 
them. This Court affirmed on the qrounds that plaintiff had 
. 
voluntarily entered into a settlement and siqned a release 
for $6,000, which release had the effect of cutting off the 
subrogation rights of plaintiff's insurance company, 
Transamerica. Id. 
The distinctions between Jones and this case are 
readily apparent. Here, Wilde has never released, volun-
tarily or otherwise, her tortfeasor. Wilde simply sued, as 
permitted by statute, to recover ~udgrnent. She was unsuc-
cessful in obtaining an amount even equal to the full 
no-fault benefits that would have been available. Since 
there was never a release by Wilde, respondent's subrogation 
riqhts against Nationwide, the insurance company of the 
tortfeasor in the oriqinal action, remain as stronq as ever. 
The cutting off of subrogation rights by settlement and 
release is the key issue that turned the decision in Jones. 
Those facts are simply not present here. 
Another distinguishable factor in Jones is that 
the plaintiff in that case was admittedly able to work, and 
was simply claiming compensation for a reduction of earninq 
capacity. The no-fault statute does not contemplate 
recovery on such a basis. Id. at 611-12. In the case at 
the Bar, the plaintiff has been totally unable to work, and 
the statute provides ·no-fault benefits for it. 
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,:QoubJ;e , Recov,exy 
The other great concern of the court in the ~ 
case is the issue of double recovery. Double recovery would 
have occurred in Jones because the plaintiff sought settle-
ment to his own advantage of $6,000 plus a second recovery 
of substantial no-fault benefits. Thus, if plaintiff had 
prevailed in that case, he would be getting paid twice for a 
single item of loss: (a) allowable no-fault benefits of 
abou"t $'5,800 era. at 610): and (b) the $6,'000 settlement. 
And this after he had cut off his own insurer's subrogation 
rights. 
However, in the case at the bar, Wilde never 
received either full compensation for her injuries or the 
full amount that she is due under the no-fault program. In 
fact, $3,587 of the $3,989 judgment has already been 
subrogated, leaving her with $402. Henc~, any amount 
awarded in the instant case simply supplements the amount 
awarded by the jury in the Caffey case, in order to make the 
plaintiff whole under the no-fault statute. Mid-Century may 
be entitled to some offsets (see Point II), but is still 
1 i able for the balance of monies due under no-fault, if and 
when proved. 
Policy Considerations 
If this Court were to sustain the lower court's 
summary Judgment .against appellant, it would discouraqe 
- 8 -
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insurance companies from paying full no-fault benefits. One 
of the purposes of the act is to reaui re the payment of 
"certain prescribed 
accidents ••. on the 
benefits in respect to motor vehicle 
basis of no-fault .•. " §31-41-2. 
Implicit in this stated purpose is to require the payment of 
those prescribed benefits (loss of waqes, household ser-
vices, etc.) freely without resort to leoal action, incur-
ring of attorney's fees, etc. If insurance companies do not 
pay those no-fault benefits freely and willingly, without 
compelling injured victims to resort to the courts, then the 
whole purpose of the no-fault act is subverted. 
If Mid-Century prevails in this case, what incen-
tive would it (or others) have in the future to pay full and 
complete no-fault benefits freely and willinoly? Why not 
just pay a s~ingy amount of benefits, or none at all, and 
risk the chance of a suit? This is especially true where 
the victim-plaintiff has a cause of action under §9 of the 
Act anp pursues the claim in the courts. If the victim is 
successful in obtaining a judgment greater than the full 
no-fault benefits to which the victim would otherwise be 
entitled, the insurance company, not having paid ful 1 bene-
fits initially, will have use of the money ~uring the 
interim before judgment. It could claim, under respondent's 
theory in this case, that the plaintiff had suffered no 
damage by the company's fa_ilure to pay the full no-fault 
- 9 -
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benef·i ts timely, 1except for a relatively brief period of 
loss of use, because if the no-fault benefits had been paid 
earlier, they would simply be subrogated at judgment. The 
victim would be repaying these benefits under subrogation 
anyway, the argument would run, and so what damage has been 
done. 
On the other hand, if the tortfeasor were to win 
the law suit, or sustain a very small judgment, the company 
could claim that the insured had "elected its remedy" and is 
not entitled to any further no-fault payments (i.e. the pay-
ments that were not fully made in the first instance). This 
is essentially .Mid-Century's position in this case where the 
amount of the judgment was very low, slightly more than the 
previous no-fault payments. Mid-Century is essentially 
saying here that Wilde forfeited (R.. 75) the riqht to any 
further no-fault benefits by filing a §9 suit: in the same 
breath, it then claims subroqation on the small judgment 
that was awarded. 
't'hus, if Mid-Century's position prevails in this 
case, it will have taken the appellant's insurance premiums, 
most of appellant's judgment ($3,587 out of $3,989) and will 
have been reimbursed by the tortfeasor' s insurance company 
for all no-fault benefits paid. Thus, appellant's insurance 
company is the only one to have been made whole in this 
entire situation. Thi·s is unjust and cannot have bee·n the 
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intent of the legislature. 
POINT II 
MID-CENTURY MAY NOT SUBROGATE, AT LEAST 
IN FULL, THE RIGHTS OF WILDE TO RECEIVE 
THE PROCEEDS OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST CAFFEY. 
Improper Subroqation 
Appellant has set forth on page 3 of this Bri~f a 
summary of the no-fault benefits received from Mid-Century 
as well as a b~eak down of a special verdict rendered by the 
jury in the Caffey case. The no-fault benefits and the 
verdict can be compared as follows: 
ITEM 
Medicals 
Loss of wages 
Household servlces loss 
Pain and suf ferinq 
Total 
NO-FAULT PAID 
BY MID-CENTURY 
$ 889 
$1,402.50 
Sl,296 
- 0 -
S3,587.50 
JUDGMF.NT 
$ 989 
S2,000 
- 0 -
$1,000 
$3,989 
It is thus clear that only medical expenses and 
loss of waqes can even arguably be claimed by Mid-Century to 
be subrogatable under equitable principles since, aependinq 
upon the facts, Mid-Century could claim that the medical 
expenses awarded in the judgment are the same as those paid 
by no-fault, although there is no evidence in the recoro 
that the expenses were not more. On lost waqes, Mi~-Century 
could arguably claim that $1,402.50 of the $2,000 awarded in 
the judgment should be subrogaten. 
As to the loss of household services and pain ana 
- 11 -
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·suf:fering, "totalling tog:e,trreT $2 ,29,6, there can he little 
doubt that these sums are not subroqatable to the judament 
by Mid-Century. The householrl services, al thouqh the jury 
made no corresponding award, were subroqated .even though 
Mid-Century is independently required to pay the same by 
statute. On pain and suffering, no no-fault reimbursement 
was paid. At most, Mid-Century could arguably claim, 
depending on the interpretation of Allstate v. Ivie, subro-
gation ri9hts on the following: 
Medical Expenses 
Lost Wages 
Total 
$ 889.48 
$1,402.50 
$2,291.98 
Mid-Century has been subrogated to the tune of $3,587.9& and 
at minimum, has thus received a windfall of $1,296.00. 
Wilde should be allowed to recover this sum. 
Retrospective Application of Law 
This fact situation presents several threshold 
auestions at the outset. First of all, the initial judgment 
in favor of Wilde against Caffey for $3,989 was not 
appealed. In that case, Caffey's insurer, Nationwide, 
allowed subrogation rights to be asserted aqainst it by 
Mid-Century. Hence, when Nationwide attempted to tender the 
supposed balance due of the judgment after the subrogation 
rights were subtracted, Wilde refused tender, in part to 
prevent the ctittinq off of Mid-Century's subrogation 'rights. 
- 12 -
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( R. 37-39: Statement of Facts in this Brief, p. 3). Wilde 
then filed an action aqainst Mid-Century to recover the 
balance due of no-fault benefits, on the theory that 
Mid-Century had breached its Personal Injury ~rotection 
contract with Wilde in not paying the balance owed. 
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint herein, 
this court handed down the decision in Allstate v. Ivie. 
Hence, counsel on remand of this case, should be allowed to 
amend the complaint to state a cause of action aqainst 
Mid-Century for all amounts subrogated by it, which are not 
found at trial to have been paid as part of the i udgment. 
Similarly, appellant Wilde should be able to amend the 
complaint seekinq reimbursement from Mid-Century of the 
$1,296 for household services, which Mid-Century also 
deducted from the judgment herein on a subroaation theory. 
There is no reason in law or eauity why the 
application of Allstate v. Ivie should not be retrospec-
tive. Retrospective application should be the presumption, 
especially where no previous case was overruled. 
Meaninq of Allstate v. Ivie 
The majority opinion in Allstate v. Ivie set forth 
several important principles regardinq subroqation. First, 
an injured party should get only those damages for which no 
reparation has been made under no-fault. Secondly, the 
insurer may not subroaate funds received by the insured for 
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,personal injuries. As stated 'hY the court: 
Under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, the 
tortfeasor who has the required security, 
is not personally liable to the injured 
person for payment of Section 6 benefits, 
Section 9(2); therefore, the tortfeasor has 
no personal leqal obligation to reimburse 
the injured party's insurer. On the other 
hand, the tortfeasor's liability insurer, 
in fulfilling its duty to respond to the 
claims of the injured party to the limits 
of its policy, stands in the shoes of its 
insured, and pays on the basis of its 
insured's personal liability to the tort 
victim, this personal liability does not 
include PIP payments. Thus, the tort 
victim's recovery from the liability 
insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP 
payments. If the victim's recovery is 
reduced by the amount of PIP payments by 
granting his no-fault insurer a right of 
protection, it is the no-fault ins-urer who 
receives double recove~y. This is because 
the insurer receives a premium for the 
benefits, and then receives full 
reimbursement, while the liability 
insurance available to recompense the 
victim is depleted by payments for which 
the liability insurer is not responsible to 
the victim. (emphasis added) Id. at 60. 
Elsewhere, it is stated that the Act cannot be 
interpreted as "conferring on the no-fault insurer a riqht 
of subrogation to the funds received by its insured for 
personal injuries." Id. 
Hence, several factual issues in the present case 
are immediately evident. Which of the stated damages 
awarded by the jury are "funds received •.• for personal 
injuries", and thus not to be subrogated? What amounts of 
the Oaffey judg.ment ar-e "recovery from the liability 
- 14 -
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.insurer" and hence "cannot be reduced by the PIP payments"? 
On the other hand, because a special verdict was used in 
this case, should certain portions of the i udgment rightly 
be considered as "double recovery" if paid by Nationwide, 
and hence subrogatable to Mid-Century? 
All of these questions involve certain questions 
of fact which the trial court should resolve, and which make 
a summary judgment inappropriate. To the extent that the 
ouestions involve legal issues, they have been wronqly 
decided. 
Possible Resolution of the Issues 
This court has several alternatives in dealinq 
with this problem: Pirst, it could simply hold that regard-
less of whether a special verdict is used, a judqment is not 
subrogatable by the insurer paying the no-fault benefits. 
This position has merit since it would avoid the very policy 
Problems inherent in tryinq to decide, for example, whether 
the amount awarded for medical expenses is the same or 
supplementary to the amount paid in no-fault benefits for 
medicals. 
This court could also, under a second alternative, 
rule that the lower court must deduct from the judqJ'C'ent 
those parts which are found at trial to be clearly 
identifiable and comparable to no-fault benefits already 
paid. In the case at the bar, this might include the 
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medicals of $889 and loss of waqes up to Sl ,402., 50. Under 
no circumstances, however, should the subroqation allowed 
include the balance of the "lost wages" awarded by the jury 
in excess of what was paid by no-fault ($2,000 - $1,402.50); 
the amount awarded for pain and suffering by the jury~ or 
the $100 more for medical expenses awarded by the jury. 
The third alternative, used by the lower court in 
this case, is totally unfair since it allows the no-fault 
insurer double recovery by permitting subrooation to Mid-
Century of everything paid under no fault. 
Appellants con tend that either of the first two 
alternatives, a firm policy of no subrogation to the 
no-fault insurer, or very limited subrogation only to 
clearly identifiable items of recovery in the judgment, 
would be acceptable. This case should be remanded to the 
District Court for a determination of these issues consis-
tent with the holding in Allstate v. Ivie. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the Summary Judqment 
granteo in favor of Mid-Century and remand the case for 
determination of the total amount of no-fault benefits to 
which Wilde is entitled for household services and loss of 
waqes. Furthermore, on remand, Wilde should also be allowed 
to amend the complaint to set forth an additional cause of 
action against Mid-Century for amounts not legally 
subrogated, pursuant to Allstate v. Ivie. 
The District Court should be instructerl, upon 
remand, that Wilde may recover, if proven at trial, the full 
amount of no-fault benefits legally available, regaraless of 
• the filing of an action to recover additional general 
damages under §9 of the Act. The lower court should also be 
instructed that any amounts proven by Wilrle at trial to have 
been subroqated unjustifiably by Mid-Century, may be 
recovered by Wilde. 
Respectfully submitted 
- 17 -
t1i.f.i-a~ 
Attorney for Appellant-
Plaintiffs 
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